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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Savage appeals, pro se, from the judgment entered upon the district
court's order denying his request for the appointment of counsel and summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the factual and procedural background of both the
underlying criminal case and the post-conviction proceedings, as follows:
Following a plea of guilty to Possession of Sexually Exploitative
Material in Canyon County Case No. CR-2007-14455, Petitioner Brandon
Savage was sentenced to a unified term of incarceration of ten years, with
the first three years fixed. Execution of the sentence was suspended, and
petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. The Judgment was
entered January 30, 2008. No appeal was filed.
On January 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief in Canyon County Case No. CV-2009-1204, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to advise him of his right
not to participate in a psycho-sexual evaluation and to consult with an
attorney during the evaluation process. The district court ultimately
determined that Petitioner was entitled to relief and Petitioner was to be
resentenced. After resentencing, an amended judgment was entered on
August 3, 2011. Petitioner was again sentenced to a unified term of
incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. As before,
execution of the sentence was suspended and Petitioner was placed on
probation for ten years. No appeal was filed. Petitioner was subsequently
found to have violated the terms of his probation on two occasions and his
probation was revoked and reinstated. Petitioner was thereafter found to
have violated the terms of his probation a third time and on November 24,
2014, the Court ordered execution of Petitioner's sentence.
Petitioner appealed, contending that the district court abused its
discretion by ordering execution of the original sentence rather than
retaining jurisdiction or reinstating probation. The decision of the district
court was affirmed in State v. Savage, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 688
(October 30, 2015). Petitioner also filed additional motions pursuant to
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Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The first, on December 19, 2014, sought a
reduction of sentence based on leniency and also credit for time served;
the second also sought credit for time served while on probation. The
Court denied the motions.
On October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed a third Rule 35 motion for
relief. In this motion Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal
because Idaho Code § 18-1507A, the code section under which he was
convicted, was repealed and replaced following his conviction.
Specifically, in 2012, the legislature repealed LC. § 18-1507A and
amended § 18-1507 to include the information previously contained in
§ 18-1507A. A new § 18-1507A was then passed, which established a
crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not
pertain to him. In denying the motion, this Court determined that Mr.
Savage was convicted pursuant to a statute in effect both at the time at the
time [sic] he committed the act at issue and at the time of his conviction
and that the conviction was therefore valid. See LC.§ 67-513. The Court
further determined that the crime for which the Defendant was convicted,
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State
of Idaho, and in 2012, the crime was simply moved from § 18-1507A to §
18-1507. The Court explained that the fact that the code section changed
in 2012 is of no import when it is clear that Defendant was convicted of
[a] crime that was in continuous effect at the time of the acts through the
present. The Rule 35 motion was therefore denied. A copy of the decision
is attached hereto.
On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a second petition for postconviction relief, Canyon County Case No. CV-16-5781. The Petition in
that case was withdrawn without prejudice.
On October 11, 2016, Petitioner filed the present action, his third
pro se verified Petition for Post-Conviction relief, wherein he alleges that
his conviction is illegal because the code section under which he was
convicted was repealed and amended and no longer applies to him. This
argument mirrors the argument presented, and rejected, in the criminal
action.
Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The
state objected to the request for counsel pursuant to Murphy v. State, 156
Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), reh 'g denied (July 1, 2014).
Contemporaneous to this objection, the State filed a motion for summary
dismissal on the grounds that this case is an impermissible successive
petition for post-conviction relief. On January 26, 2017, the State filed a
supplemental motion for summary dismissal asserting the Petitioner failed
to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that the doctrine of
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res judicata bars the claim presented. Mr. Savage filed his pro se response
to the supplemental motion on February 22, 2017.
(R., pp.114-16 (footnoted omitted).)
Following a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal (see R., p.2), the
district court entered an Order Denying Appointment of Counsel and Granting Summary
Dismissal (R., pp.114-26). The court found the allegations in the petition failed to raise
even the possibility of a valid claim because the petition was untimely and because the
claim therein-that Savage's conviction and sentence were illegal because the statute
under which he had been convicted was repealed and amended-was barred by res

judicata and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R., pp.116-20.)
The court entered a Final Judgment of dismissal, from which Savage timely appealed.
(R., pp.127-33.) Savage also filed a motion for the appointment of appellate counsel,
which the district court denied. (R., pp.134-37, 145-47.)
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ISSUE
Savage's Appellant's Brief does not contain a "short and concise" statement of the
issues on appeal, as required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). (See Appellant's Brief, p.5.) The state
phrases the issue on appeal as:

Has Savage failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his request
for counsel and summarily dismissing his untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Savage Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His Request
For Counsel And Summarily Dismissing His Untimely, Successive Petition For PostConviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Savage filed his third post-conviction petition on October 11, 2016, more than

eight years after the entry of the initial judgment and more than five years after the entry
of the amended judgment filed in his criminal case. (R., pp.4, 114-15.) The district court
denied Savage's motion for the appointment of counsel and granted the state's motion for
summary dismissal, finding that the petition was not timely and that the claim therein was
both barred by res judicata and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
(R., pp.114-26.)

Savage challenges the court's order denying counsel and summarily

dismissing his petition but, in doing so, he merely repeats the arguments he made below
and does not address the district court's rulings. (See, generally, Appellant's brief.) This
Court should affirm the district court's order on the unchallenged bases that the petition
was not timely and that the claim therein was barred by res judicata and failed to state a
claim for relief. This Court may also affirm the court's order on the alternative basis,
argued by the state below, that the petition was an impermissible successive petition.

B.

Standards Of Review
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed

by LC. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel
lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792,
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102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct.
App. 2009).
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate
court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Kelly v. State, 149
Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
When the basis for a trial court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, the appellate
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67,
956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Savage Has Failed To Challenge Any Of The Bases Upon Which The District
Court Denied His Request For Counsel And Dismissed His Petition And, As
Such, Has Failed To Show Any Error
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. LC. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,522, 164 P.3d
798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative, if the
applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential
element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).

6

Until controverted by the state,

allegations in a verified post-conviction application are, for purposes of determining
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545,
531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994).
When a post-conviction petitioner requests counsel and "alleges facts showing the
possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on the defendant's
behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist the petitioner in
developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15
(2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. If, on the other hand, the claims
in the petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could be
developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and further
investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the usual
procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman, 144 Idaho at
529, 164 P.3d at 809; Hust, 147 Idaho at 684,214 P.3d at 670.
Applying the foregoing principles, the district court denied Savage's motion for
the appointment of counsel and summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition because
the petition was untimely and the claim therein was barred by the doctrine of res judicata
and otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R., pp.114-26.)
Savage argues the district court erred (see Appellant's brief, p.6), but he has failed to
address, much less challenge with argument and authority, any of the bases for the district
court's rulings (see, generally. Appellant's brief).
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Because Savage has not even

addressed the district court's rulings, much less identified any alleged error in the court's
reasons for dismissal, the court's order denying counsel and summarily dismissing
Savage's petition must be affirmed. Goodwin, 131 Idaho at 366-67, 956 at 1313-14 (trial
court's rulings will be affirmed on unchallenged bases); see also Stewart v. Sun Valley
Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004) ("Error is never presumed on appeal
and the burden of showing it is on the party alleging it." (quotations omitted)); Farrell v.
Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378,390, 64 P.3d 304,316 (2002) (appellant
carries burden of showing error on record and error never presumed); State v. Mowrey,
128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (appellant has burden of showing error in
record). Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court's order on the merits of
the district court's rulings set forth in its Order Denying Appointment of Counsel and
Granting Summary Dismissal (see R., pp.114-26 (Appendix A)), which the state adopts
as part of its argument on appeal.

D.

This Court May Also Affirm The District Court's Order Denying Counsel And
Summarily Dismissing Savage's Post-Conviction Petition On The Alternative
Basis That The Petition Was An Impermissible Successive Petition
The state moved to dismiss Savage's post-conviction petition on the bases that it

was untimely and successive. (R., pp.31-33.) The district court found the petition was
untimely (see R., pp.116-17) but concluded it was not impermissibly successive (see R.,
pp.119-20). Correct application of the law, however, shows the petition was, in fact,
impermissibly successive.

This Court may therefore affirm the district court's order

denying counsel and summarily dismissing Savage's petition on this alternative basis.
See Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925,930 (2010) (an order of summary
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dismissal may be affirmed on appeal on the grounds asserted in the state's motion to
dismiss if no material issue of fact on those grounds is contained in the record); Baxter v.
State, 149 Idaho 859, 864-865, 243 P.3d 675, 680-681 (Ct. App. 2010) (same).
A successive petition for post-conviction relief is generally not permissible. LC. §
19-4908 (claims not raised in initial post-conviction proceedings generally waived). Only
in cases where the petitioner can show "sufficient reason" why claims were "inadequately
presented in the original case" may he have the opportunity to re-litigate them. Griffin v.
State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); see also
LC. § 19-4908. An analysis of whether "sufficient reason" exists to file a successive
petition includes an analysis of whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time"
after the petitioner's discovery of the factual basis for the claim. Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). "In determining what a reasonable time is
for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis,
as has been done in capital cases." Id. at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.
Although the district court recognized Savage's October 2016 petition was
"technically a successive petition for post-conviction relief' (R., p.119), it concluded the
petition was not impermissibly successive because the claim therein - that a 2009
amendment to the statute under which Savage was charged rendered his conviction and
sentence illegal - "could not have been raised" in his initial post-conviction petition (R.,
pp.119-20). Even assuming the truth of the latter proposition, Savage's October 2016
petition was still barred by LC. § 19-4908. As set forth above, an analysis of whether a
"sufficient reason" exists to file a successive petition necessarily requires consideration of
whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable time" of the discovery of the factual
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basis of the claim. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 874. Savage filed the
post-conviction petition at issue in this case more than seven years after the 2009
amendment to the statute that formed the basis of his claim for post-conviction relief.
Because Savage did not allege, much less demonstrate, that the seven-year delay was
reasonable, he failed to show he filed his successive petition within a "reasonable time"
of the discovery of his claim and, thus, necessarily failed to show any "sufficient reason"
for bringing his successive petition. The court's order denying counsel and summarily
dismissing Savage's post-conviction petition should be affirmed on this alternative basis.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the district
court's order denying the appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing Savage's
successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of December, 2017, served two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
BRANDON SAVAGE
6307 W. FRANKLIN RD.
BOISE, ID 83 709
/s/ Lori A. Fleming
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/vr
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

BRANDON E. SAVAGE,
Petitioner,
-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2016-10012*C

ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

Respondent.
_______________

Following a plea of guilty to Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material in Canyon
County Case No. CR-2007-14455, Petitioner Brandon Savage was sentenced to a unified term of
incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. Execution of the sentence was
suspended, and petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. The Judgment was entered
January 30, 2008. No appeal was filed.
On January 30, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Canyon
County Case No. CV-2009-1204, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's
failure to advise him of his right not to participate in a psycho-sexual evaluation and to consult
with an attorney during the evaluation process. The district court ultimately determined that
Petitioner was entitled to relief and Petitioner was to be resentenced. After resentencing, an
amended judgment was entered on August 3, 2011. Petitioner was again sentenced to a unified
term of incarceration of ten years, with the first three years fixed. As before, execution of the
sentence was suspended and Petitioner was placed on probation for ten years. No appeal was
filed. Petitioner was subsequently found to have violated the terms of his probation on two
occasions and his probation was revoked and reinstated. Petitioner was thereafter found to have
ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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--

--

violated the terms of his probation a third time and on November 24, 2014, the Court ordered
execution of Petitioner's sentence.
Petitioner appealed, contending that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
execution of the original sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction or reinstating probation. The
decision of the district court was affirmed in State v. Savage, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 688
(October 30, 2015). Petitioner also filed additional motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
The first, on December 19, 2014, sought a reduction of sentence based on leniency and also
credit for time served; the second also sought credit for time served while on probation. The
Court denied the motions.
On October 17, 2016, Petitioner filed a third Rule 35 motion for relief. In this motion
Petitioner alleged that his sentence was illegal because Idaho Code §18-1507A, the code section
under which he was convicted, was repealed and replaced following his conviction. Specifically,
in 2012, the legislature repealed I.C. §18-1507A and amended §18-1507 to include the
information previously contained in §18-1507A. A new §18-1507A was then passed, which
established a crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not pertain
to him. In denying the motion, this Court determined that Mr. Savage was convicted pursuant to
a statute in effect both at the time at the time he committed the act at issue and at the time of his
conviction and that the conviction was therefore valid. See I.C. § 67-513. The Court further
determined that the crime for which the Defendant was convicted, Possession of Sexually
Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State of Idaho, and in 2012, the crime was simply
moved from §18-1507A to §18-1507. The Court explained that the fact that the code section
changed in 2012 is of no import when it is clear that Defendant was convicted of crime that was
in continuous effect at the time of the acts through the present. The Rule 35 motion was therefore
denied. A copy of the decision is attached hereto 1
On June 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, Canyon
County Case No. CV-16-5781. The Petition in that case was withdrawn without prejudice.

1
The Court also denied a motion for summary judgment that Mr. Savage brought with respect to his Rule 35
motion.

ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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On October 11, 2016, Petitioner filed the present action, his third pro se verified Petition
for Post-Conviction relief, wherein he alleges that his conviction is illegal because the code
section under which he was convicted was repealed and amended and no longer applies to him.
This argument mirrors the argument presented, and rejected, in the criminal action.
Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. The State objected to the
request for counsel pursuant to Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), reh'g
denied (July 1, 2014). Contemporaneous to this objection, the State filed a motion for summary

dismissal on the grounds that this case is an impermissible successive petition for postconviction relief. On January 26, 2017, the State filed a supplemental motion for summary
dismissal asserting the Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that
the doctrine of res judicata bars the claim presented. Mr. Savage filed his prose response to the
supplemental motion on February 22, 2017.
I.

Motion to Appoint Counsel
A petitioner in a civil post-conviction proceeding is not constitutionally or statutorily

entitled to appointment of counsel if he cannot afford to hire an attorney. Fields v. State, 135
Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000); Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365,
371 (2014). Rather, the decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies
within the discretion of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789 at 792, 102 P.3d
1108 at 1111 (2004). Within the parameters of this discretion, where facts are alleged that give
rise to the possibility of a valid claim, a court should appoint counsel. Charboneau v. State, 144
Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). As set forth below, there is no possibility of a valid claim in this
case, and the Court therefore declines to appoint counsel.
A. The Claim is Untimely
First, the Court notes that this Petition is untimely. Generally, a post-conviction claim
based upon the statute underlying a conviction must be brought within one year plus forty-two
days from the date the judgment was entered. In this case, the applicable judgment was entered
August 3, 2011, which makes the deadline for filing a claim September 14, 2012. The Court
takes judicial notice that the statutory amendments at issue here went into effect July 1, 2012.
ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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Petitioner has not demonstrated why this issue could not have been raised prior to the September
14, 2012 deadline. Assuming for purposes of argument that the Petitioner had one year after the
statutory amendments went into effect in which to file a claim, the deadline for filing the claim
expired in 2013. The present petition was not filed until October of 2016, several years beyond
the deadline for bringing the claim. Even if the applicable time period is not one year, but rather
whether the claim was asserted within a reasonable period of time, the court finds that four years
is not reasonable under the circumstances of this case. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d at 875. As Petitioner does not demonstrate any facts that could justify equitable tolling, the
Court finds that the petition is untimely.2

B. The Claim is Barred Pursuant to the Doctrine of res iudicata
The Claim presented is barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata
precludes re-litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or decision
in another action between the same litigants. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481,
482 (2000). Thus, a valid final judgment or post-judgment decision rendered on the merits is an
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same claim. Hindmarsh v.
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). The "sameness" of a claim for res judicata

purposes is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of action.
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149, 804 P.2d 319, 322 (1990). "A valid and

final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Id. at 150, 804 P.2d at 323.
Therefore, res judicata's preclusive effect bars "not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim
previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same cause of
action which were actually made or which might have been made" in the first suit. Hindmarsh,
138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63,343 P.3d 497,505 (2015).

2

Although the Court found this case is untimely, this finding goes only to Mr. Savage's request
for appointment of counsel. The case is not dismissed as untimely as the issue was not addressed
by the parties with respect to the motion for summary dismissal.

ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL AND GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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The rationale behind res judicata has been set forth as follows:
[The] expectation that entire controversies will be presented and that all relevant
material will be produced has long been the rule in Idaho: 'We think the correct
rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or
demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim But also as to
every matter which might or should have been litigated in the first suit.'
(Emphasis added.) Joyce v. Murphy Land Etc. Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P.
241, 242 (1922)." Ramseyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 554, 556, 569 P.2d 358, 360
(1977).

Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 603 P.2d 1005 (1979). The same rationale that there should be

some finality to litigation is also found in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. § 194908.
Applying the foregoing, the Court finds that the claim presented by Mr. Savage arose out
of the same transaction as Mr. Savage's most recent Rule 35 motion: his sentencing and the
subsequent legislative restructuring. The Court also finds that the issues presented in the present
action and the most recent Rule 35 are identical: whether the legislative restructuring rendered
Mr. Savage's sentence illegal. The parties are also the same. The order denying Mr. Savage's
Rule 35 motion was issued December 23, 2016. He had forty-two days from that date in which to
file an appeal. He failed to do so. The decision is therefore final. Because that order decided the
issues presented in this case, and that decision is final, the doctrine of res judicata precludes Mr.
Savage from reasserting that claim here. See State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9, 966 P.2d 1, 9
(1998); See also State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 62,343 P.3d 497,504 (2015).
C. The Petition Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be Granted
Even if the claim were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata the claims made by Mr.
Savage fail on the merits. The claims made and the operational facts in the present action are
identical to those made in the criminal case.
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Mr. Savage was originally convicted of possession of sexually exploitative material
pursuant to I.C. §18-1507A. In 2012, the legislature repealed LC. §18-1507A and amended §181507 to incorporate the language previously contained in § 18-1507A, including the language
setting forth the crime of possession of exploitative material. A new §18-1507A was then
enacted, which established a crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means. Mr.
Savage's criminal act does not fall within the parameters of the new §18-1507A. Mr. Savage's
argument is that this change to § 18-1507A has the effect of making his conviction illegal.
The order denying Rule 35 relief in CR-2007-14455 is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
hereby incorporated and the decision and reasoning adopted. As the Court pointed out in that
order, the sentence is valid pursuant to Idaho Code §67-513. Additionally, the legislature's act
of moving a crime from one section to another, in this case from §l8-1507A to §18-1507 does
not negate the validity of the conviction nor does it result in an improper ex post facto law. The
act of possession of sexually exploitative material continues to encompass the act for which Mr.
Savage was convicted and the penalty remains unchanged. The specific elements detailing that
crime were not eliminated; rather they were simply incorporated into §18-1507. Given this, the
Court finds that Mr. Savage fails to set forth a claim recognized by LC. §19-4901
For the above reasons, the Court finds the Petition does not give rise to the possibility of
a valid claim. His request for counsel is therefore denied.
IL State's Motion for Summary Dismissal
The State moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is an impermissible
successive petition, that Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, and
that the claim is barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
Although the present action is technically a successive petition for post-conviction relief,
the code changes were not made until after the 2009 Petition was entirely resolved. If an initial
post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent
application outside of the one-year limitation period if the court finds a ground for relief asserted
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application. LC. § 19-4908; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,
904, 174 P.3d 870,874 (2007). Thus, because the claim in this action could not have been raised
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in the 2009 petition, it is not an impermissible successive petition relative to the first petition for
post-conviction relief.

This case is likewise not an impermissible successive petition with

respect to the second petition for post-conviction relief that was filed in June of 2016. The
petition in that case was withdrawn without prejudice. The mere existence of that case does not
act as a bar to the present action. For these reasons, the State's motion to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that it is an impermissible successive petition is denied.
The State's next two bases for dismissal, that Petitioner failed to state a claim for which
relief can be granted and that the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, are related. As
the Court set forth in detail above, the doctrine of res judicata is applicable in this case as the
parties in the criminal case were the same and the issue that was adjudicated to final resolution is
identical. The State's motion on this ground is therefore granted.
The State's assertion that Mr. Savage failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted, goes to the heart of the Court's ruling on the Rule 35 motion. Again, the analysis of this
issue is set forth in some detail above. Also as set forth above, the Court hereby adopts and
incorporates its decision and reasoning in the criminal case, CR-2007-14455, and applies it to the
current matter. The State's Motion to Dismiss due to failure to state a claim is granted.
Conclusion
For the reasons as set forth above, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED
and the State's motion for summary dismissal is GRANTED.
DATED this \$"'day of March, 2017.

vis F. VanderVelde
District Judge
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-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

STATE OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF CANYON

)
) ss
)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was forwarded to
the following:
Bryan F. Taylor
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney
1115 Albany Street
Caldwell, ID 83605
Brandon E. Savage
In Mate No. 88078
ISCI
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
Either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by personal service.
DATED this

\~'\i\day

of March, 2017.

Chris Yamamoto,

Cle~Mfilf"rt
by Deputy Clerk of the Court
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DEC 2 3 20·;3
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
S MEHIEL, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

BRANDON EUGENE SAVAGE,
Defendant.
________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CR-2007-14455

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RULE 35 RELIEF

Procedural History
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's third motion for relief pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Randall Grove appears on behalf of the Defendant; Anne Voss appears
on behalf of the State ofldaho. The procedural history of this case is as follows:
Following a plea of guilty to an amended charge of possession of sexually exploitative
material pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1507A, Petitioner was sentenced to a unified term of
incarceration of ten years, the first three of which were fixed. Execution of the sentence was
suspended and Petitioner was placed on probation for a period of ten years. Judgment was
entered on January 30, 2008. Petitioner thereafter filed a filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
relief - Canyon County Case No. CV-09-1204. Ultimately, the Petition was granted and the
court ordered that Mr. Savage be resentenced. Thereafter, the sentencing judge recused herself
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and a new judge was assigned to preside over the case. A new pre-sentence investigation report
and psycho-sexual evaluation were ordered. After a new sentencing hearing was held, an
Amended Judgment was entered on August 3, 2011, again sentencing the Defendant to a unified
term of incarceration of ten years, the first three of which were fixed. Execution of the sentence
was also suspended once again, and the Defendant was placed on probation for a period of ten
years.
The Defendant was subsequently found to have violated the terms of his probation, and
on April 6, 2012, an order was entered revoking and reinstating probation. In 2013, the
Defendant was again found to be in violation of the terms of his probation. A second order on
probation violation was entered on November 13, 2013 revoking and reinstating probation and
extending it for a period of two years. On October 29, 2014, the court found that Petitioner
violated the terms of his probation a third time, and as a result, on November 24, 2014, a Second
Amended Judgment was entered whereupon the sentence previously suspended was imposed.
The Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in
State v. Savage, Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion 688 (Oct. 30, 2015).

Along with his appeal, the Defendant filed a motion for leniency and credit for time
served pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35). The order denying Rule 35 relief was
entered December 23, 2014. The Defendant thereafter filed a second motion for Rule 35 relief
alleging his sentence was illegal due to the failure of the Idaho Department of Correction to
provide appropriate medical treatment. The Court issued an order denying the motion on March
25, 2016.
The Defendant has now filed a third Rule 35 motion, again alleging his sentence is
illegal. In the present motion, Defendant alleges his sentenced is illegal because, in 2012, the

ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RULE 35 RELIEF - 2

--

--

legislature repealed LC. §18-1507A and amended §18-1507 to include the information
previously contained in §18-1507A. A new §18-1507A was then passed, which established a
crime of sexual exploitation of a child by electronic means, which does not pertain to him.
Defendant argues that because §18-1507A, the code section under which he was convicted, was
repealed and replaced with a different crime, that his conviction pursuant to that statute is illegal.
The State objects to the Rule 35 motion, asserting that the statutory amendment was not
an improper ex post facto law. The State further points out that in 2012, when §18-1507A was
repealed, §18-1507 was simultaneously amended to include the penalties previously contained in
§18-1507A.

Analysis
Idaho Code§ 67-513 sets forth:
The repeal of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the
prosecution and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so
repealed, unless the intention to bar such prosecution and punishment is expressly
declared in the repealing act.
The acts which constitute the nature of the crime for which Defendant was convicted
occurred in 2006 and 2007. Defendant was convicted in 2011 upon entry of the Amended
Judgment under Idaho Code § 18-1507A as written. This was prior to the statute's repeal or
replacement or any legislative amendments enacted in 2012. Thus, references to Idaho Code §
18-1507A in the Second Amended Judgment entered November 24, 2014, are appropriate as
they reference the law in place at the time of the Defendant's conviction in 2011. Further, there
is no indication in the 2012 re-codification that the legislature intended to void prior prosecutions
under Idaho Code§ 18-1507A as written at the time of Defendant's conviction.
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Moreover, the crime for which the Defendant was convicted, Possession of Sexually
Exploitative Material, remains a crime in the State of Idaho and the crime has simply been
moved from §18-1507A to §18-1507. 1 At the time of Defendant's conviction, Idaho Code§ 181507A made it a crime to knowingly and willfully possess sexually exploitative material.
Subsequent to the 2012 amendments, that same act is now criminalized in §18-1507(2)(a). The
fact that the code section changed in 2012 is of no import when the prior judgments and the
specific crime identified by name make it clear that Defendant was convicted of the crime of
Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material. For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's
Rule 35 motion is without merit and must be denied.
Additionally, contemporaneously with his Rule 35 motion, the Defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment as to his Rule 35 motion. The State did not respond. A motion for
summary judgment is made pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. I.R.C.P. 56. There is
no corresponding criminal rule. As such, a motion for summary judgment is not appropriate in
the context of a criminal case and will be denied.
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's motion
for summary judgment and motion for Rule 35 relief are DENIED.

JUDGE

Dated: December~' 2016.

DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE
Davis F. V anderVelde
District Judge

1

The acts which constitute the crime have also been expanded, however that is not at issue here.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

s!J3_

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of December, 2016, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
RULE 35 RELIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following persons:
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
1115 Albany St
Caldwell, ID 83605

CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
111 N. 11 th Ave., Ste. 120
Caldwell, ID 83605

D

U.S.Mail

[CJ

D
D

Facsimile
Overnight Mail
E-Mail

D

U.S. Mail

fil Hand Delivered

Qi Hand Delivered

0- Facsimile
D Overnight Mail
D

E-Mail

'Q]

U.S.Mail
[r Hand Delivered
D Facsimile
Overnight Mail
DE-Mail

Brandon Savage
IDOC #88078
c/o I.S.C.I.
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

D

&u.s.Mail
[:]- Hand Delivered
D Facsimile
D Overnight Mail
D E-Mail

Idaho Department of Correction
Records Department
1299 N. Orchard Street
Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83 706

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:~

DeputyClrk
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